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LOSS DISTRIBUTION IN WAR-TIME IMPOSSIBILITY OF
PERFORMANCE:::
WHF-N a change of circumstances due to war-time conditions makes con-
tract performance a substantially different undertaking from that contem-
plated by the parties, the defendant in an action for breach of contract may
invoke the defense of impossibility of performance.' This defense, which arose
in response to the harshness of the early common law,2 has been expanded to
include bargains whose performance is impracticable, though not strictly impos-
sible.3 The impossibility doctrine, however, has been substantially qualified
by the foreseeability test." Courts universally hold that when the defendant
alone could have foreseen the impossibility, he cannot escape liability.5 Many
hold that the defense is equally unavailable when the impossibility was fore-
seeable by both parties.0 Only when the defendant could not have foreseen
the circumstances is impossibility always a good defense.
7
Whenever the impossibility defense is sustained, plaintiff loses the benefit
* L. N. Jackson & Co. v. Royal Norwegian Government, 177 F2d 694 (2d Cir. 1949);
1 SY-icusE L. REv. 497 (1950) ; 98 U. oF Pa. L. Rnv. 592 (1950).
1. The leading American case is The Kronprinzessin Cecile, 244 U.S. 12 (1917). The
impossibility defense itself is a relatively recent development in contract law, having first
been applied in Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 B & S 826 (K.B. 1863). Its first use in wartime was
in World War I, 6 WMX.USTON, CoM.AcTs § 1938 (Rev. ed. 1938). The defense may be
based on a change of law or an administrative order rendering performance impossible
even though the defendant was active in bringing that change about. See Mfawhinney v.
Mfilbrook WooIen Afills, 231 N.Y. 290, 132 N.E. 93 (1921) ; 6 WILiso:, Co:iwcrs
§§ 1938, 1939 (Rev. ed. 1938):
2. The severity of the common law rule of Paradine v. Jane, Aleyn, 26 (1646), that
a contract is absolutely binding on the promisor, was illustrated in Hills v. Sughrue, 15
Al. & V. 253 (1846), where a contract to load a full cargo of guano at a given island vas
enforced, although there was not enough guano on that island for such cargo.
3. The expansion of the concept beyond absolute impossibility has long been recog-
nized. E.g., Dahl v. Nelson, Donkin, & Co., 6 App. Cas. 33 (1881) ; Mlineral Park Land
Co. v. Howard, 172 Cal. 289, 156 Pac. 45S (1916).
4. E.g., Chicago, f. & St.P.Ry. v. Hoyt, 149 U.S. 1 (1S92) ; fadeirense Do Brasil
S/A v. Stulman-Emrick Lumber Co., 147 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1945).
5. 6 WIn SroN, CoNTvaAcrs § 1959 (Rev. ed. 1938), and cases cited.
6. Companhia De Navagacao Lloyd Brasileiro v. C. G. Blake Co., 34 F.2d 616 (2d
Cir. 1929) (impossibility defense unavailable where strike which caused the impossibility
known to both parties at time of contract); Glens Falls Indemnity Co. v. Perscallo,
-Cal.2d-, 216 P.2d 567 (1950) (impossibility no defense since performance-defeating
government regulations foreseeable to all Americans at time of contract).
Other courts, however, allow the impossibility defense where the contingency was
clearly foreseeable to both parties. E.g., The Kronprinzessin Cecile, 244 U.S. 12 (1917)
(outbreak of war a few days later excused non-performance of a contract entered into on
July 27, 1914).
7. REsTATEmI r, Co-xTAcrs §§ 456, 457 (1932).
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of his bargain and bears whatever "out-of-pocket" losses he has suffered in
reliance on the contract. When liability is imposed, he may receive not only
reliance damages, but also expectation damages for anticipated profits lost
due to the breach. 8
L. N. Jackson & Co. v. Royal Norwegian GovernmentO raised squarely the
problems of war-time impossibility. Defendant contracted to carry a cargo of
copra for plaintiff from East Africa to New York, and in reliance on this
booking, plaintiff contracted to buy the copra. Prior to the booking, defendant
had submitted to the Ship Warrants Act.'0 Under this Act, the Norwegian
Government agreed to accept United States Maritime Commission orders as
to cargoes, voyages, and rates in exchange for priorities in the use of American-
controlled harbor facilities." Subsequent to the booking, but before the copra
was loaded, the United States entered World War II, and the Maritime Com-
mission ordered the defendant to carry wool instead. 12 Defendant complied,
and when sued for breach of contract, argued that the administrative order
made performance of the copra-carrying contract impossible.
In denying recovery, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals found that the
parties had equal knowledge of the situation. Both knew of defendant's
participation in the warrant system,'3 and hence, the court felt, defendant was
under no obligation to protect himself by express stipulation against the sys-
tem's operation. Neither party, however, could have foreseen the Pearl Harbor
attack which was the immediate cause of the Maritime Commission's order.
The court further noted the fragmentary nature of the contract, which did not
8. MCCORmICK, LAw OF DAMAGES § 137 (1935). Plaintiff can recover only general
damages as a matter of course. Any recovery for special damages he may have suffered is
limited by such rules as those barring recovery where damages are speculative in nature, id.
§§ 25-8, or where the loss was not reasonably foreseeable to the defendant at the time the
contract was made, id. § 138.
9. 177 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1949).
10. 55 STAr. 591 (1941).
11. There were coercive pressures to submit to the Warrant system, as was pointed
out when the Act was passed: "No man must go and get a warrant for his vessel, but if he
does not get a warrant, it means that he is foreclosed so far as certain facilities are con-
cerned, so far as docks and wharves and fuel and loading facilities are concerned. So
there is the indirect pressure by which vessel owners must go and get themselves a war-
rant from the Maritime Commission." Rep. Dirksen, 87 CONG. Rc. 4288 (1941). Further-
more, as a government in exile, the Norwegian government was in a poor position to
defy orders of the United States Government.
12. Failure to obey would have subjected defendant both to loss of his priorities on
harbor facilities and to criminal penalties, 55 STAT. 591, 592 (1941).
13. 177 F.2d 694, 699-700. Factually, this conclusion seems sound, although Judge
L. Hand, dissenting, was unconvinced that plaintiff had any knowledge that defendant
was under the Ship Warrants Act, id. at 702. In view of the fact that this act was the
"most important development" in American shipping at the time, id. at 699, and the
fact that the contract showed on its face that it was being forwarded to the Maritime
Commission, L. N. Jackson & Co. v. Lorentzen, 83 F. Supp. 486, 488 n.1 (S.D. N.Y. 1949),
it is difficult to see how plaintiff could have been unaware of the situation.
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purport to set forth the obligations of the parties in detail.14 These considera-
tions led the court to the conclusion that "fairness and justice" required that
defendant's non-performance be excused.' 5
But there is no compelling reason why it is more "fair and just," in the
.ackson situation, to place the full risk of loss on plaintiff than defendant. It
could be argued with equal force that, although the parties were in an equal
position to foresee impossibility, the shipowner would be the non-performing
party should that impossibility occur; and therefore it was his duty to provide
expressly against the risk.
Furthermore, foreseeability is a matter of degree. 0 This makes it especially
easy for a court to resolve foreseeability either way when the impossibility is
of such a nature that the parties are bound to be in the same position-i.e.,
both able to foresee or both unable to foresee. Yet the results may be opposite
depending on which is chosen. If both are unable to foresee, impossibility is
a good defense.17 If both are able to foresee, many courts reject the impos-
sibility defense despite the fact that either party could be held to have knowingly
assumed the risk.' 8
The inconclusiveness of the foreseeability test is heightened by confusion
among American courts as to which party must bear the burden of proof on that
issue.19 In the Jackson case the majority apparently required plaintiff to
prove that impossibility was foreseeable to the defendant alone, - o while Judge
Hand in his dissent insisted that the defendant must show that it was not. Since
ordinarily neither party can conclusively prove or disprove foreseeability, any
result can be justified on the ground that the losing party did not sustain his
burden of proof.
14. The contract stated only the amount to be shipped, the price, and the time of pay-
ment. 83 F. Supp. 486, 488 n.1 (S.D. N.Y. 1949).
15. 177 F.2d 694, 699.
16. Felder v. Oldham, 199 Ga. 820, 35 S.E2d 497 (1945) (war always foreseeable,
therefore impossibility due to wartime labor shortage is no defense). Compare Berg v.
Erikson, 234 Fed. 817 (8th Cir. 1916) (unprecedented drought a foreseeable contingency),
with Ontario Deciduous Fruit-Growers' Ass'n v. Cutting Fruit-Packing Co, 134 Cal.
21, 66 Pac. 28 (1901) (drought unforeseeable). And see Williston's statement: "Any
kind of impossibility is more or less capable of anticipation. The question is one of de-
gree... ." 6 WLLISToN, Coxmcrs § 1953 (Rev. ed. 1938).
17. See note 7 supra.
18. See note 6 supra.
19. Some cases apparently place the burden of proving non-foreseeabiity on the de-
fendant. Companhia De Navagacao Lloyd Brasileiro v. C. G. Blake Co., 34 F2d 616,
619 (2d Cir. 1928) ; Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal.2d 48, 153 P.2d 47, 50-52 (1944). But the
language used in other cases indicates that the burden of proving foreseeability rests on
the plaintiff. The Kronprinzessin Cecile, 244 U.S. 12, 22, 24 (1917); Texas Co. v.
Hogarth Shipping Co., 256 U.S. 619, 631 (1921).
20. In reaching this result, the court followed the English rule that once impossibility
is shown, plaintiff must prove an exception to the defense. See Joseph Constantine Steam-
ship Line, Ltd. v. Imperial Smelting Corp., Ltd. [1941] 2 All F_.. 165, rvevrsing [1940]
3 All E.R. 211, noted in 19 CAx. B. Rsv. 612 (1941).
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The greatest difficulty with the impossibility defense, however, is the "all-or-
nothing" rule of damages. 21 This leads to an unfair result in many cases no
matter how the foreseeability doctrine is applied. Thus plaintiff may be denied
any recovery, or allowed full recovery when he deserves part; either alternative
is unfair where the parties are equally innocent.22 In the Jackson case neither
result would be satisfactory in view of the patent impossibility of performance
on the one hand, coupled with plaintiff's reliance losses and defendant's sub-
stitute contract on the other.
A less doctrinal approach would treat the defense of impossibility as a plea
of "excusable breach." The defense should not prevail where the defendant
alone knew, or reasonably should have known, that there was a substantial
likelihood of impossibility. In this limited situation the defendant should be
liable for plaintiff's "out-of-pocket" expenses and anticipated profits lost due
to the breach.2 3  Conversely, if the plaintiff alone was in a position to foresee
the impossibility, that fact should constitute a complete defense. But where
plaintiff and defendant were in an equal position to anticipate difficulty, liability
should be treated as essentially a problem of loss distribution,24 based on the
parties' economic position resulting from defendant's non-performance.2 5 If
the plaintiff suffered no "out-of-pocket" losses as a result of the breach, no
recovery should be allowed since plaintiff has sustained no actual loss.2"
Similarly, unless the defendant obtained a profitable substitute contract in
connection with the impossibilitkr, the burden should be left as it fell, since he
21. See page 1512 supra.
22. For a general discussion, see Fuller & Perdue, Reliance Intercst in Cotltract Dans-
ages: I, H,46 YALE L.J. 52, 373 (1936).
23. Since the defendant is entirely at fault, there is no reason for denying full re-
covery to the plaintiff. The policies of preventing and curing to the fullest extent the
harms occasioned by his reliance, and of facilitating reliance on business agreements,
should therefore be given full sway. Cf. Fuller & Perdue, Reliance Interest in& Contract
Damages: I, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 59-62 (1936).
24. Loss distribution is not entirely alien to American law, as is shown by the "gen-
eral average" rule in admiralty, whereby the shipper and the owner share the loss in
certain situations. See ROBINson, ADMIRALTY § 103 (1939). Further evidence of loss
distribution is to be found in the comparative negligence statutes of Georgia, Mississipp,
Nebraska, Virginia, and Wisconsin. See PROSsER, LAW oF ToRts § 53, pp. 405-6 (1941).
25. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has shown some willingness to fix liability
on the basis of the ultimate economic position of the parties resulting from a breach. L.
Albert & Son v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 178 F.2d 182 (2d Cir. 1949) held inter alia that
while promisee could recover his reliance losses, promisor could offset against hin the
amount promisee would have lost had promisor performed. See Note, 63 HARy. L. REv.
1068 (1950).
26. This rule should also apply to cases where, subsequent to defendant's excusable
breach, the plaintiff recovers his "out-of-pocket" losses from the market. Where plain-
tiff recovers part of those losses, that part should be subtracted from his total reliance
loss.
It is recognized that defendant in this situation may have profited from a substitute con-
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